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Abstract 
We analyse the effects of public sector sponsored training for the unem-
ployed in the transition process in East Germany. For the microeconomet-
ric analysis, we use a new, large and informative administrative database 
that allows us to use matching methods to reduce potential selection bias, 
disaggregate programme types, and to observe interesting labour market 
outcomes over 8 years. We find that, generally, all training programmes 
under investigation increase long-term employment prospects and earn-
ings. However, as an important exception, the longer training pro-
grammes are on average not helpful for their male participants. At least 
part of the explanation for this negative result is that caseworkers se-
verely misjudged the structure of the future demand for skills. 
Keywords: Active labour market policy, nonparametric identification, 
matching estimation, causal effects, programme evaluation, panel data, 
gender differences 
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1 Introduction* 
In 1990, East Germany faced a sudden change from a centrally planned 
economy of the Soviet type to the West German type of a market econ-
omy. Due to the unification process with West Germany, East Germany 
almost immediately took over almost all rules and regulations that govern 
economic life (currency, legal order, wage structure, social system, etc.). 
Transitional arrangements were rare, thus for example, a low wage policy 
by devaluating the currency, as other transitions countries did, was not 
possible. The East German economy responded with a dramatic rise in un-
employment after the monetary, economic and social union in 1990 that 
persists until today. To cope with the unemployment problem and to ad-
just the skill level and skill composition of the labour force to the demand 
of the new market economy, the German government used active labour 
market policies (ALMP) on an extensive scale. For example, at its peak in 
1992, expenditures for ALMP summed up to more than 9% of the East 
German GDP.  
In contrast, other transition economies that also faced a change in the 
skill composition of labour demand, like Poland, the Czech Republic, the 
Slovak Republic and Hungary, spent only between 0.3% and 1.4% of its 
GDP on ALMP measures in 1992 (Puhani and Steiner, 1996). In all Eastern 
European transition countries, including East Germany, training pro-
grammes were an important part of the ALMP. Most of these countries, 
with the exception of Hungary (see O'Leary, 1998a), provided shorter 
training courses with durations of only a few weeks to no more than 4-6 
months (OECD, 1996a). However, in East Germany - again taking over 
the West German model - training programmes were typically more in-
tense and had longer durations. For example, so-called retraining courses, 
                                                
* The first author has further affiliations with CEPR, London, ZEW, Mannheim, IZA, Bonn 
and PSI, London. Financial support from the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsfor-
schung (IAB), Nuremberg, (project 6-531) is gratefully acknowledged. Conny Wunsch 
is also grateful for financial support from the IAB (doctoral thesis grant). The data 
originated from a joint effort with Annette Bergemann, Bernd Fitzenberger and Stefan 
Speckesser to make the administrative data accessible for research. We presented the 
paper in seminars at the University of St. Gallen. We thank participants for helpful 
comments. We also thank Stefan Bender for helpful comments on a previous version 
of the paper. The usual disclaimer applies. The interested reader will find additional 
background material for this paper (internet appendix) on our website 
www.siaw.unisg.ch/lechner/lmw_fuu_ost. 
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 14/2005   
 
6
which provided a new professional degree and made up a substantial part 
of training polices, had durations of about 2 years and sometimes even up 
to 3 years. In this paper, we are interested in the effects of these training 
programmes on the long-term labour market prospects of the unemployed 
subjected to these policies. 
There already is some econometric evidence on the effectiveness of public 
sector sponsored training in the Eastern European transition economies. It 
suggests that the short programmes offered in Poland (O'Leary 1998b; 
O'Leary, Kolodziejczyk and Lázár 1998; Puhani 1999; Kluve, Lehmann and 
Schmidt 1999, 2004)1 and the Slovak Republic (Lubyova and Van Ours 
1999) have succeeded in raising individual employment probabilities. The 
same seems to hold for the somewhat longer Hungarian programmes 
(O'Leary 1998a; O'Leary, Kolodziejczyk and Lázár 1998).  
For East Germany, the evidence is mixed. The earlier studies2 use survey 
data from the German Socioeconomic Panel or the Labour Market Monitor. 
Both panel surveys are rather limited with respect to sample sizes and the 
availability of sufficiently detailed information to account for programme 
heterogeneity. Most of these studies use parametric models3 and find ne-
gative or insignificant short- to medium-term employment effects (e.g. 
Pannenberg 1995; Hübler 1998, Hujer and Wellner 2000), but there are 
also studies which obtain positive effects (e.g. Pannenberg and Helberger 
1997; Prey 1999). The lack of robustness of the estimates may have sev-
eral reasons: sensitivity of the results to the different parametric assump-
tions, small sample sizes, and inability to measure long-run effects. The 
latter are important for similar programmes in West Germany: there the 
rather long durations of the German programmes lead to quite substantial 
lock-in effects and positive effects only appeared some time after the pro-
                                                
1  Earlier studies of Puhani (1996) and Puhani and Steiner (1997) find, however, no sig-
nificant effects. 
2  Pannenberg (1995), Pannenberg and Helberger (1997), Fitzenberger and Prey (1998, 
2000), Hübler (1997,1998), Staat (1997), Kraus, Puhani and Steiner (1999), Lechner 
(1999, 2000), Prey (1999), Hujer and Wellner (2000). For a recent survey of the ex-
isting econometric evaluation studies, see Wunsch (2005). 
3  Semi- or non-parametric approaches are used by Hujer and Wellner (2000) and Lech-
ner (1999, 2000). 
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gramme (Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch 2004) which the above-mentioned 
studies may not have picked up. 
Evidence that is more recent and based on new administrative data shows 
that negative lock-in effects during and shortly after programme participa-
tion are indeed important in East Germany as well. Hujer, Thomsen and 
Zeiss (2004) estimate a multivariate mixed proportional hazard rate mo-
del to analyse the effects of public sector sponsored training conducted in 
the period 2000-2002 on the transition rate into regular employment. Sin-
ce they estimate the effects only at the beginning and shortly after the 
end of the programmes, the usual negative lock-in effects drive their re-
sults. Speckesser (2004) and Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005) use the 
same data basis as we do but restrict their analysis to one special type of 
public sector sponsored training - short and medium-term provision of 
specific professional skills and techniques - and follow individuals only up 
to 36 months after the beginning of the programme. Both studies apply 
propensity score matching on samples stratified by unemployment dura-
tion and date of entry into unemployment. They find negative lock-in ef-
fects up to 12-18 months after programme start. Speckesser (2004) who 
focuses on training conducted in the period 1993-1994 finds no significant 
effects thereafter, mainly because of strongly decreasing numbers of ob-
servations towards the end of his observation period. Fitzenberger and 
Speckesser (2005) who cover a longer period of programme participation 
(1990-1997) obtain positive employment effects of about 5-10 percentage 
points about 20 months after programme start. 
For several reasons, none of these studies was able to consider long-run 
effects, although these are particularly relevant for training programmes 
that have a long duration. In fact, the only papers considering effects after 
5 years or later are concerned with Western market economies (see Couch 
1991; Hotz, Imbens and Klerman 2000; Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan 
2004; Jesperson, Munch and Skipper 2004; Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch 
2004; and Winter-Ebmer 2001). They all seem to agree that the appear-
ance of positive long-run effects of training is fairly likely (as opposed to 
the previous literature, which, based on shorter time horizons, could not 
agree on any likely sign of the training effects; see e.g. Martin and Grubb 
2001). 
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We extend the current literature in several dimensions. First, using a new-
ly available administrative database allows us to measure the effects of 
different training programmes over 8 years, thus uncovering the poten-
tially important long-run effects, and check their homogeneity across pro-
grammes and groups of participants. Second, the database is of good 
quality with respect to information concerning the selection process, so 
that this problem should not harm our study in a very substantial way. 
Third, the sample used is large enough to allow non- or at least semi-
parametric estimation of the effects using matching methods. 
In this study, we concentrate on training programmes that started in 1993 
and 1994. In general, we confirm the positive findings of long-term effects 
of training that appeared in the literature for western OECD countries 
mentioned above. This general finding is, however, not at all true for men 
participating in longer training programmes. One explanation for the 
negative results for men is that caseworkers in East Germany tended to 
retrain many of the male unemployed towards occupations in the con-
struction sector (about 70% of the participants of retraining) that experi-
enced a boom during those years. Unfortunately, soon after the courses 
were completed the boom went into a bust and the blessings of having 
obtained funding for long vocational training became a curse for its par-
ticipants. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: In the next section, we describe 
the institutional settings of the labour market policies that are important 
to understand how we proceed in the empirical sections of the paper. Sec-
tion 3 explains our definitions of the sample and the groups of pro-
grammes. Section 4 analyses the determinants of participating in the vari-
ous programmes and Section 5 outlines our econometric strategy. Section 
6 presents the main results as well as a sensitivity analysis. Section 7 con-
cludes. Four appendices provide additional information about data, 
econometrics, and results. 
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2 Labour market policies in East Germany 
2.1 The unemployment insurance system and the active 
labour market policy 
In Germany, the Federal Employment Agency (FEA) executes the passive 
and active labour market policy.4 In case of unemployment, individuals 
can receive unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosengeld, UB) for at least six 
and up to about 28 months (depending on the duration of prior contribu-
tion to the unemployment insurance system, UI, and age) if they regis-
tered as unemployed and contributed sufficiently to UI.5 Participation in 
ALMP measures has direct implications for UB entitlement. Not only is the 
willingness to participate in ALMP a requirement for UB eligibility,6 but 
times in which individuals participate in training and receive income sup-
port from the FEA count in the same way towards future benefits as in-
sured employment does for both the acquisition and the duration of an UB 
claim. This implies that participating in public sector sponsored training 
can lead to the acquisition of a new UB claim or to the prolongation of an 
existing one. After exhaustion of their UB claim, the unemployed can re-
ceive unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe, UA), which can be paid 
until retirement age if they pass a regularly repeated means test. In con-
trast to UB, paid out of UI contributions, UA funds come from the German 
Federal Government (tax revenue). 
Table 2.1 shows the expenditure for different measures of passive and ac-
tive labour market policies for the years 1991-2003. East Germany un-
derwent dramatic economic and structural changes during the transition 
from a centrally planned to a market economy during the early nineties 
leading to a particular use of ALMP measures. On the one hand, the East 
German economy was contracting rapidly leading to dramatic reductions 
                                                
4 In the early 1990s the legal basis for the activities of the FEA was the Employment 
Promotion Act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, EPA) which regulates the policy measures 
available in the labour offices. The EPA, enacted in 1969 and since then repeatedly  
amended, was abolished on January 1st, 1998, and replaced by Social Code III. Since 
this paper analyses FEA supported training in 1993-1994, we refer to the EPA legisla-
tion effective in 1993-1994 everywhere in this paper. 
5 For a more detailed description of the German UI system see Wunsch (2005). 
6 UB recipients who refuse to participate in ALMP measures or drop out prematurely for 
no good reason (like having found a job) risk suspension of their benefits of up to eight 
weeks or even loosing their claim after repeated refusal.  
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in labour demand. To cope with the immediate strongly adverse effects of 
this, short time work and early retirement schemes were used quite ex-
tensively. On the other hand, the skills of the labour force did not meet 
the requirements of a modern market economy, so that the introduction 
of different kinds of training programmes on a large scale was supposed 
to lessen these skill deficits. However, unemployment kept rising and be-
came very persistent, so that employment programmes also became one 
of the most important ALMP measures. The increasing persistence of un-
employment led to rising expenditures for unemployment benefits and es-
pecially unemployment assistance (Table 2.1). 
Short time work (Kurzarbeit, STW) traditionally aims at preventing layoffs 
due to temporary unanticipated reductions in a firm's labour demand. 
Workers in STW only work a few hours per week or month and receive in-
come support to supplement their reduced earnings. In East Germany di-
rectly after Unification, however, STW was also used when it was clear 
that the reduction in labour demand was permanent. Especially in 1991, 
the main objective of STW was to delay the transition into unemployment 
to prevent the official unemployment rate from skyrocketing. 
Table 2.1: Expenditure for passive and active labour market policy in East 
Germany 1991-2003 
 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 
Total expenditure 15,426 27,724 21,232 24,055 25,416 24,645 25,769 
 Shares of total expenditure for active and passive labour market policy in % 
Training 14 19 17 12 12 13 9 
Temporary wage subsidies 2 <1 <1 <1 1 3 4 
Short-time work 33 2 1 1 <1 <1 <1 
Job creation schemes 10 17 20 15 11 9 5 
Structural adjustment measures - - - - 6 3 2 
Early retirement 9 25 5 <1 <1 <1 <1 
Rehabilitation programmes <1 1 2 3 2 3 3 
Unemployment benefits 26 24 31 42 33 33 31 
Unemployment assistance 1 7 14 18 21 21 28 
Other expenditure 5 7 10 10 12 14 17 
Unemployment rate in % 10.2 15.4 14.8 19.1 18.7 18.8 20.1 
Sources:  BA (1992-2004). 
Notes: Expenditure in million Euro. Training: further training, retraining, short training. Temporary wage subsidies are 
subsidies during the phase of initial skill adaptation in a new job (Einarbeitungs-/Einstellungszuschüsse). Short time 
work: Kurzarbeit. Job creation schemes: Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnahmen. Structural adjustment measures: 
Strukturanpassungsmassnahmen. Early retirement: Vorruhestand/Altersteilzeit/Altersübergangsgeld. 'Other ex-
penditure' mainly includes counselling and job placement services as well as administrative costs of the FEA.  
Early retirement schemes seek to lower unemployment directly by reduc-
ing the labour supply of older individuals. To cope with the rapid drop in 
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 14/2005   
 
11
labour demand directly following Unification, the German Federal Govern-
ment introduced a specific early retirement scheme for East Germany to 
encourage withdrawal of elderly workers from the labour market. It re-
leases unemployed East Germans of age 55 and older from the obligation 
to search for a job while claiming benefits from the FEA. Instead of receiv-
ing UB/UA, these people receive so-called pension transition allowances 
(Altersübergangsgeld). 
Training programmes - which are the subject of this study and are de-
scribed in more detail in Section 2.2 - had the important task of adjusting 
the in many respects inadequate skills of the East German labour force to 
the requirements of a modern market economy. 
Employment programmes provide subsidised jobs outside the regular la-
bour market that have to be in the interest of the public. In East Germany 
there were two forms of employment programmes in the early 1990s: job 
creation schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnahmen, JCS) which were also 
available in West Germany though with more restrictive eligibility criteria, 
and so-called productive wage subsidies (produktiver Lohnkostenzu-
schuss, § 249h EPA). The latter had been introduced specifically for East 
Germany and were characterised by less restrictive eligibility criteria than 
those of JCS. They have been replaced by so-called structural adjustment 
measures (Strukturanpassungsmassnahmen, SAM) in 1998. In times of 
high and persistent unemployment, employment programmes are an im-
portant measure to maintain the employability of unemployed and espe-
cially long-term unemployed persons, as well as to preserve social stability 
in regions with particularly high rates of unemployment. 
In 1991 one third of the expenditure for East Germany were devoted to 
STW and more than 1.6 million people were directly absorbed into STW 
(see Table 2.2). Another 0.8 million individuals were referred to training 
measures. Among them, 25% participated in very short measures (§ 41a 
EPA). In addition, 183,000 individuals were absorbed by JCS. This pattern 
started to change already in 1992. The number of recipients of STW com-
pensations declined substantially while utilisation of JCS and retraining 
were extended significantly. In addition, substantial funds were devoted 
towards payment of pension transition allowances (included in 'early re-
tirement' in Table 2.1) in the period 1992-1994. While STW lost its impor-
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tance after 1993, job creation schemes became increasingly important e-
ven though the number of participants declined over the years. In 1993, 
there were still 237,000 participants in JCS. Until 1996, the number varied 
around 200,000 participants. With the introduction of SAM in 1998, the 
number of participants in employment programmes increased temporarily 
but has now declined to only about 110,000 in 2003. The number of par-
ticipants in training measures declined drastically in 1993 due to abolish-
ment of the § 41a programme. It decreased further until 1997 (with the 
exception of a temporary increase in 1996). Since 1998 the number of 
training participants is rising due to increasing use of short training (≤ 3 
months) which has been reintroduced in that year under the label of so-
called training measures (Trainingsmassnahmen). 
Table 2.2: Participants in the quantitatively most important ALMP Measures 
1991-2003 
 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 
Training (total) a) c) 760 263 237 155 350 415 468 
Further training (in % of total) 83 69 78 83 NA NA NA 
Short training (in % of total) 25 - - - 48 55 80 
Retraining (in % of total) 17 31 22 17 NA NA NA 
Temporary wage subsidy a) 133 31 20 11 65 99 107 
Job creation schemes b) 183 237 206 154 168 123 70 
Structural adjustment measures b) - - - - 180 67 40 
Short-time work b) 1616 181 71 49 27 27 35 
Pension transition allowance b) 189 639 341 58 - - - 
Sources: BA (1992-2004). 
Notes: a) Total number of inflows(1000 persons). b) Yearly average (1000 persons). c) Since 1998, further training and re-
training can no longer be distinguished. Until 1992, short training included courses according to §41a AFG, since 
1998 it consists of so-called training measures (Trainingsmassnahmen). Temporary wage subsidies are subsidies 
during the phase of initial skill adaptation in a new job (Einarbeitungs-/Eingliederungszuschüsse). Job creation 
scheme: Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnahmen. Structural adjustment measures: Strukturanpassungsmassnahmen 
(since 1998). Short time work (STW): Kurzarbeit. Pension transition allowance (Altersübergangsgeld). NA: not 
available. 
2.2 The use of FEA supported training during East  
German transition 
In Germany, training consists of heterogeneous instruments that differ 
largely in the form and the intensity of the human capital investment as 
well as in their respective duration. During East German transition the fol-
lowing three groups of training measures have been used extensively: (i) 
short training according to § 41a EPA which has been abolished at the end 
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of 1992,7 (ii) further training, and (iii) retraining.8 Since our analysis cov-
ers participation in FEA supported training between 1993 and 1994, short 
programmes are not considered. According to the EPA (§§ 41, 43), the 
courses offered either (a) assess, maintain or improve the occupational 
knowledge and skills of the participant, (b) adjust skills to technological 
changes, (c) facilitate a career improvement, or (d) award a first profes-
sional degree. In the East German transition process, however, the use of 
categories (c) and (d) was negligible since the main objective of training 
programmes was to adjust the skills of the East German labour force to 
the requirements of a modern market economy. 
One form of further training, belonging to category (a) or (b), were 
courses in so-called practice firms that simulate - though under very real-
istic conditions - working in a specific field of profession. The other 
courses included in categories (a) and (b) had a mean duration of nine 
months in 1994. Dropout and failure rates were very low in these two 
categories: only 0.3% of participants failed and no more than 5% dropped 
out prematurely for reasons other than having found a job. 
Retraining enables working in a different profession than the one currently 
held by qualifying for a new professional degree. The mean duration in 
1994 was 22 months, 18% of participants spent more than two years in 
the programme. The dropout (3% in 1994) and failure rates (10% in 
1994) were significantly higher than for further training but still low com-
pared to West Germany (see Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch 2004). 
                                                
7  These courses had a maximum duration of nine weeks and provided information on 
the services available from the FEA, an initial skills assessment as well as basic job 
search assistance.  
8  The FEA also supports two other forms of training: regular vocational training in the 
German apprenticeship system and German language courses. See Wunsch (2005) for 
details. 
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Table 2.3: Original and target professions by programme group in 1993-1994 
  Short training Long training Retraining UE rate 
Profession Original Target Original Target Original Target 1994 2002 
  Men     
None* 13 - 8 - 14 -     
No information - 22 - 4 - 4    
Agriculture, gardening, forestry, mining  8 3 5 2 10 2 24 31 
Metal production/processing, mechanics  37 26 17 9 34 2 15 19 
Textile/leather manufacturing  3 - 1 1 2 - 59 42 
Food and nuitrition  1 - 2 2 3 1 33 30 
Construction 6 12 4 12 6 18 6 33 
Construction related handcraft  12 12 8 13 5 53 9 28 
Technical profession, other manufacturing 12 11 27 23 15 4 16 19 
Office work  2 3 6 25 1 7 16 20 
Health/social services, education  3 2 7 2 2 3 9 9 
Other services  5 11 6 8 10 7 22 28 
Correlation(% target - % origin, UE rate 
1994) -0.21 -0.15 -0.24   
Correlation(% target - % origin, UE rate 
2002) 0.15 0.15 0.18   
  Women     
None* 12 - 3 - 7 -     
No information 1 34 1 9 - 8    
Agriculture, gardening, forestry, mining  5 2 6 3 12 9 24 31 
Metal production/processing, mechanics  4 1 1 0 5 1 15 19 
Textile/leather manufacturing  8 2 5 0 16 - 59 42 
Food and nutrition  5 3 6 3 3 4 33 30 
Construction - - <1 1 - - 6 33 
Construction related handcraft  2 1 2 0 3 5 9 28 
Technical profession, other manufacturing 13 2 15 6 12 5 16 19 
Office work  36 42 42 65 16 36 16 20 
Health/social services, education  6 6 13 6 13 18 9 9 
Other services  10 7 7 6 12 14 22 28 
Correlation(% target - % origin, UE rate 
1994) -0.34 -0.15 -0.56   
Correlation(% target - % origin, UE rate 
2002) -0.19 -0.09 -0.51   
Source: Own calculations on the basis of our evaluation sample (see Section 3). UE rates: BA (1992-2004). 
Note: Entries in %. UE rate: number of unemployed in the respective profession as a percentage of the 
sum of socially insured employees and registered unemployed in 1996/2002. * No formal profes-
sional degree. 
Table 2.3 shows the shares in the original professional (before training) 
and the target professions (the training programme is planned to qualify 
for) for our evaluation sample of training participants in 1993 and 1994 
for men (upper panel) and women (lower panel) and the different types of 
training. The last two columns give the profession specific unemployment 
rates in 1994 and 2002. In general, we see that those men in the metal 
production/processing and mechanics sector are much more likely to re-
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ceive either short training or retraining, whereas long training is some-
what concentrated among the technical professions. For women, long and 
short training is concentrated in office related occupations. Female re-
trainees are more evenly spread across occupations. Comparing the origi-
nal and target professions for participants in short training is somewhat 
difficult because about the latter, information is missing for about 20% of 
participants. However, given the rules and regulations and the fact that 
courses have planned durations of up to 6 months it appears to be 
unlikely that participants plan to change profession using such courses. 
For long training for men we find that certain professions decline to some 
extent, like the group of agriculture, mining, forestry, and metal related 
occupations as well as technical professions and the group of health, social 
services and education, whereas others increase like construction related 
as well as office related professions. For women in long training we see a 
considerable increase in office related occupations, and a decrease every-
where else. 
The most interesting case is clearly retraining. For about 71% of the male 
unemployed the target profession of retraining was construction related 
(in particular craft related professions),9 whereas this share was only 5% 
for women. The male share of this type of occupation in the original pro-
fession was only 11%. This change is clearly negatively related to the un-
employment rate in 1994 and positively (!!) related to the unemployment 
rate in 2002. In fact, the construction sector went from boom to bust just 
while most of the retrainees attended their programmes. The inflow into 
construction comes from all occupations with the exception of the group 
health/social services, education (see Table IA.1 in the internet appendix). 
About one third of the women had some office related target profession, 
and about another 20% were directed towards health, social and educa-
tion related professions, and another 14% towards other services which is 
negatively related to the respective unemployment rates in 1994 and 
2002. 
                                                
9  There was a construction boom after unification that bust in the second half of the 
decade. 
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These choices of target professions by the caseworkers and unemployed 
may have been rational (given a shortsighted view) in the years 1993 and 
1994 where the major destinations for male and female unemployed sho-
wed average or below average unemployment rates. However, the long-
run prediction for the males turned out to be very bad, because of the 
bust in the construction sector. In 2002, the unemployment rates in the 
construction related professions were around 30% compared to an already 
high East German average of about 22%. The women were luckier, since 
the unemployment rates in their main target professions are below aver-
age. This view is confirmed by the correlations between the difference in 
the shares in target and original profession and the unemployment rates 
in 1994 and 2002. For 1994, the correlation is negative for all types of 
training and both men and women which indicates the rational strategy of 
directing jobseekers to professions with low unemployment rates. How-
ever, ex post the strategy for men turned out as counterproductive. Men 
had been trained in professions with particularly high unemployment rates 
in 2002 which is resembled in the positive correlation in Table 2.3. In con-
trast, for women the correlation is still negative in 2002 indicating that the 
choices of the caseworkers had just been right for them. We come back to 
this issue when discussing the results. 
The FEA can support participation in further training and retraining by 
paying a maintenance allowance (MA)10 and by bearing the direct cost of 
the programme, as well as by covering parts of additional expenses for 
childcare, transportation and accommodation. In 1994, expenditure of the 
FEA for further training and retraining amounted to 4.6 bn DM for pay-
ment of MA plus 2.4 bn DM for programme costs (in total about 3.4 bn 
EUR) in East Germany (BA, 1995).11 Most courses were full-time courses 
(more than 97% in 1994). In addition to pure classroom training, a course 
can include on-the-job training (OJT). This is frequently the case in 
                                                
10 Until 1993, the amount of MA received was 73% of the previous net income with at 
least 1 dependent child and 65% without children. In 1994 the replacement rates 
were reduced to 67% and 60%, respectively, which is the same amount as unem-
ployment benefits. 
11 More disaggregated information about the cost of specific programmes is not publicly 
available in Germany. 
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courses that award a professional degree since OJT is mandatory in the 
German apprenticeship system with only very few exceptions.  
Target groups of further training and retraining are defined implicitly by 
eligibility rules. In the period under consideration, FEA support for training 
was restricted to individuals with a first professional degree or a minimum 
number of years of work experience.12 In addition, the potential partici-
pant had to be either unemployed, directly threatened with unemploy-
ment, or without any professional degree. An additional requirement was 
a minimum duration of insured employment (two years) or, alternatively, 
receipt of UB or UA before entering the programme.13 Due to special regu-
lations for East Germany regarding UB entitlement, virtually everyone was 
entitled to UB (and thus, MA) when becoming unemployed for the first 
time after German unification. 
3 Definition of the estimation sample and the 
programmes 
3.1 The data 
We use the same administrative database as in Lechner, Miquel and 
Wunsch (2004) and refer the reader to that paper for more details. It 
stems from three different sources: the IAB Employment Subsample (ES), 
the benefit payment register (BPR), and the training participant data 
(TPD).14 For East Germany, the database covers the period 1990-2002. It 
contains many, if not most, variables influencing the selection process into 
these programmes (see Appendix A for the variables used in our analysis 
and the discussion of the selection process below). It allows a precise 
                                                
12 Until the end of 1993 the requirement was a formal professional degree plus three 
years of work experience, or no degree but at least six years of work experience. 
From 1994 on, the work experience requirement was abolished for individuals with a 
formal professional degree and reduced to three years for all others. 
13 § 46 EPA. Individuals who did not meet these additional requirements could only apply 
for reimbursement of the cost of the programme (§§ 42, 44-45 EPA). Until the end of 
1993 individuals who did not meet these requirements had the possibility to apply for 
MA as a loan. 
14 The common German abbreviations for these data sources are IABS, LED and FuU. A 
detailed description of the ES and the BPR is provided by Bender et al. (1996) and 
Bender, Haas and Klose (2000). For the TPD see Miquel, Wunsch and Lechner (2002). 
See also Bender et al. (2005) for how the data has been prepared for evaluation pur-
poses. 
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measurement of interesting outcome variables, particularly those related 
to individual employment status. Furthermore, it contains information 
about different programme types and it has a sufficient number of obser-
vations for the major programme groups. 
Of course, there are several drawbacks as well, five of those could be im-
portant: First, there are groups of individuals, like nonworking recipients 
of social assistance, self-employed, and civil servants ("Beamte"), who are 
not paying social insurance contributions and are thus not covered by this 
data. Second, employment that is not subject to social security contribu-
tions is unobserved, and it is possible to distinguish between subsidised 
and regular employment in the first labour market only from the year 
2000 onwards. This problem is particularly severe for East Germany, be-
cause of a substantial part of the labour force participated in job creation 
schemes and similar employment programmes during the 1990s. 
Third, the unification process had a direct impact on the data gathering: 
The data collection system that depends to a considerable part on reports 
from employers was phased in after unification. Some employers provided 
information as early as 1991 whereas in most cases it took until 1992 until 
all employers were registered with the authorities. Therefore, implicitly 
our sample is selected on either having an initial employment or unem-
ployment spell in the data. However, since later on we condition on having 
an (observable) employment spell prior to the unemployment spell leading 
to participation, this is no serious issue. The other drawback is that infor-
mation about long-term employment histories is absent. However, since in 
the German Democratic Republic unemployment was (officially) absent 
and labour force participation was very high, the resulting additional un-
observed heterogeneity should be very small. Furthermore, unification per 
se certainly discounts the value of human capital and experience obtained 
under the old centrally planned economic system. 
Fourth, the training information for East Germany prior to 1993 is incom-
plete and not correctly coded. Fifth, individual information about the un-
employed as assessed by the caseworker (like in Gerfin and Lechner 
2002) is missing. Despite these drawbacks, given that so far evaluation 
studies for East Germany relied on much smaller survey data requiring 
substantial aggregation across programmes, this database is a substantial 
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improvement in several dimensions, like sample size, selection and out-
come information, as well as observable programme heterogeneity. 
3.2 Definition of programmes and programme participa-
tion 
When aggregating the specific training programme types into groups we 
use the following criteria: homogeneity of subprogrammes with respect to 
selection, to contents and to organisation, sample size, and information 
available to distinguish reliably different types of programmes. Table 3.1 
shows the resulting five groups of training programmes plus a residual 
category. Ignoring the programme types for which the number of obser-
vations is too small, we restrict our analysis to general further vocational 
training and retraining programmes (see the descriptions in the previous 
section). Since the first group of programmes is fairly large and heteroge-
neous, we split them into two groups based on the planned duration of a 
particular programme. To characterise the programme and not its partici-
pants, planned instead of actual duration has the clear advantage that the 
behaviour of the individual during participation does not influence it. Fig-
ure 3.1 shows that the planned duration varies between one month for 
short training programmes and up to three years for some retraining 
courses. Generally, the German programmes are long on average com-
pared to other OECD and transition countries (e.g. OECD 1996a, b). 
Table 3.1: Definition of programmes 
Programme Description 
Short training Further training (i) with the aim of a general adjustment of working skills in the profession held; 
(ii) to obtain an additional qualification in the profession held; (iii) to obtain a first professional 
degree; planned duration ≤ 6 months.   
Long training Same types as short training with a planned duration > 6 months.  
Retraining Training to obtain a new professional degree in a field other than the profession currently held. 
Practice firm Further training that simulates a job in a specific field of profession 
Career improvement Further training to obtain a higher professional degree, e.g. master craftsman, technician, or a 
(below university) degree in business administration. 
German language courses: for immigrants from eastern Europe with German origin; participants 
receive income support during participation. 
Temporary wage subsidies: for individuals with reduced productivity e.g. due to long-term un-
employment who take up a regular job during the phase of initial skill adaptation (Einarbeitungs-
zuschüsse) for usually 6 month, sometimes up to 12 months; 30-50% of the wage. 
Other 
 
Training while being employed.   
Note:  Other is a residual category that comprises very heterogeneous, small programmes. Therefore, the latter is not 
evaluated. Due to insufficient sample size in the categories practice firm and career improvement, these are also 
not evaluated in this study. 
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Next, we define ‘participation’ and our population of interest. First, since 
the programme participation data (TPD) is of good quality only after 1992, 
we consider programme participation between 1993 and 1994. This allows 
us to focus on recent programmes while at the same time still having an 
observation period that allows us to detect long-run effects.15 Moreover, 
before 1993 training programmes had not been well targeted and were 
often very general compared to later programmes, because during the 
early stages of transition, the main objective of training and other ALMP 
programmes had been to keep people out of the official unemployment 
statistics and to avoid social hardship associated with long-term unem-
ployment (Buttler and Emmerich 1994; Kraus, Puhani and Steiner 1999). 
Second, a person is included in our population of interest if she starts an 
unemployment spell between 1993 and 1994. The group of participants in 
training consists of all persons entering a programme between the begin-
ning of the first unemployment spell after 1992 and the end of 1994. If 
there are multiple treatments over time, only the first one is included in 
the analysis (if it occurred 1993-1994). 
Figure 3.1: Distribution of the planned programme duration 
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Note: This is the planned duration of a programme determined before the programme starts.  
 
The left panel of Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of starting months in 
the two-year window we consider. Partly due to the construction of our 
sample, the probability of treatment increases over time. The right panel 
                                                
15 Furthermore, since we observe only training spells after the participant left training, 
and some courses have a duration of more than two years, and there is no training in-
formation after 1997, concentrating on the years 1993 and 1994 does not lead to a 
selective underrepresentation of long training spells. 
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of Figure 3.2 shows the months it takes until participation after the begin-
ning of the 'defining' unemployment spell (the first UE spell between 1993 
and 1994). From the latter chart it seems that a considerable group of 
trainees enter training fairly (surprisingly) early in the spell, particularly 
for retraining. 
Figure 3.2: Distribution of start dates and duration until start of programmes  
(in %) 
       Month of programme start       Number of months until participation 
        
 
Note: Monthly measurement based on estimation sample for participants. 
 
Given our definition of a small treatment window, it is particularly impor-
tant for the interpretation of our results which share of the nonparticipants 
receives training later on. Furthermore, there is the issue of programme 
careers, i.e. UE participating in more than one programme over time. The 
conceptual problem with analysing the effect of e.g. the second participa-
tion is that it might be subject to sample selection influenced by the effect 
of the first programme. Thus, such an analysis of the effects of sequences 
of programmes requires a dynamic evaluation approach as suggested by 
Miquel and Lechner (2001) and Lechner (2004), which is not feasible with 
our data without further aggregation of programme types, which, in turn, 
is undesirable for obvious reasons. Table 3.3 shows that the problem does 
not appear to be too severe: About 17% of those classified as nonpartici-
pants get some training between 1995 and 1997 (the participation data 
ends 1997) and less than 10% of the trainees participate a second time, 
mostly in the same programme type they already participated in.  
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Table 3.3: Participation in different programme types in % of participants in 
subsamples until 1997 
 Treatment status in study (first treatment) 
Programme participa-
tion between 1993 and 
1997  
Non-
participation 
Short 
training  
Long training  Retraining Practice 
Firm 
Career 
improve-
ment 
Other  
Short training 8.8 8.7 6.7 0.7 8.0 12.5 3.4 
Long training 3.7 2.8 2.8 1.3 4.3 0 0.8 
Retraining 1.8 2.2 0.9 1.0 3.1 0 0 
Practice firm 1.8 5.9 0.2 1.6 2.5 0 0.8 
Career improvement 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 0.8 0.3 1.1 0.5 0.02 12.5 0 
Total other treatments 
than first treatment 16.9 11.2 8.9 4.0 15.5 25 5.1 
Note: Entries show the fraction (%) of members of the subsamples stated in the columns who participated at least once 
in the treatments stated in rows after their first treatment (programme participants) or after 1994 (nonparticipants). 
Due to data restrictions of the TPD data base only training spells completed by the end of 1997 are observable.  
3.3 Selection of population and sample 
When choosing the appropriate subpopulation of our inflow sample into 
unemployment 1993 and 1994, we aim at having a homogenous group of 
people covering the prime age part of the population of East Germany that 
are eligible for participation in the programmes. Thus, we require that all 
individuals were employed16 at least once prior to programme participa-
tion and that they were receiving UB or UA in the month before the pro-
gramme start and in the month of the programme start for the non-
participants.17 This, however, requires the use of variables measured rela-
tively to the programme start.18 In this paper, we follow one of the ap-
proaches suggested by Lechner (1999). We simulate start dates for non-
participants by drawing start dates from the empirical distribution for par-
ticipants and then ensuring that this date does not lie before the begin-
                                                
16 'Employed' means that we observe the person at least once in an insured employment 
spell in the ES (for the majority of our individuals, the first observation in the data is 
an employment spell). 
17 In fact, receipt of UB or UA directly before entering a programme is not entirely suffi-
cient to ensure eligibility. Individuals must also meet the requirement of either having 
a formal professional degree plus three years of work experience (since 1994, zero 
years), or alternatively at least six years (since 1994, three years) of work experience, 
where times of registered unemployment also count as work experience up to half of 
the required minimum number of years, thus by also requiring individuals to be em-
ployed at least once before the programme, the remaining group of participant and 
nonparticipants is most likely to be eligible. 
18 All variables potentially influencing selection into programmes and outcomes are 
measured relatively to the start of the programme (or earlier). 
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ning of the 'defining' UE spell or after the end of the person's last spell ob-
served in the data.19 To avoid most influences coming from retirement, 
early retirement and primary education, we also impose an age restriction 
(20-53 years).20 Concentrating on the main body of the active labour force 
for which we could also assume a homogenous selection process, we ex-
clude unemployed who were - before the 'defining' UE spell - trainees, 
home workers, apprentices or without previous employment or whose 
previous employment was less intensive in terms of hours than half of a 
full-time equivalent. Furthermore, since the group of ‘Non-Germans’ is ex-
tremely heterogeneous in East Germany (there is no ‘stable’ and at least 
partly assimilated guest worker population as in West Germany), we drop 
them as well. 
Table 3.4: Sample selection rules  
 Nonpar-
ticipation 
Short Train-
ing 
Long Train-
ing 
Retraining Practice firm Other 
Persons entering unemployment 
between Jan. '93 and Dec. '94 
17574 418 692 531 203 180 
Simulated programme start after the entry in unemployment (UE) and before the end of the observation period 
Remaining observations 12904 418 692 531 203 180 
Eligibility: Only individuals receiving UB or UA in the month before the programme start (also in the month of the programme 
start for the non-participants) 
Remaining observations 6599 400 656 496 198 152 
Personal characteristics :  a) 20 ≤ age ≤ 53;  b) no trainees or apprentices; c) at least one observation of employment;  
                 d) no home workers; e) no part-time worker less than half of a full-time work; f) only German  
Final sample 4604 321 538 445 162 126 
Note:  All variables are measured before or in the same year as the start of the programme. Note that in this table the 
residual category other includes career improvement. Due to the small number of observations, practice firms and 
other are not evaluated. 
Table 3.4 shows how the sample shrinks imposing these criteria succes-
sively. The largest drop in the number of observations occurs for the 
group of nonparticipants to make them a priori comparable to the treated 
using the criteria above, which they have to fulfil at the simulated start 
date. However, since we still keep almost 5000 unemployed nonpartici-
pants, the large reduction is of no serious concern. The reduction in the 
number of the participants is fairly small and about 20% on average. 
                                                
19 Nonparticipants who do not satisfy this criterion are excluded from the sample. 
20 Measured in the year of the beginning of the programme (simulated start date for 
nonparticipants). 
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4 The determinants of programme participation 
4.1 Eligibility, assignment and self-selection into pro-
grammes 
As in every evaluation study, the key to address the sample selection (en-
dogeneity) problem is to obtain an understanding of how different unem-
ployed end up in different programmes or in no programme at all. Instead 
of postulating a complete structural model for the selection process, we 
discuss the main determinants of selection and then explain which ob-
servable variables may capture them. The determinants fall into two 
groups: those required by legislation (eligibility), and those that may be 
underlying the decisions of the caseworker and the unemployed. 
Beginning with the role of the legislation, remember that to become eligi-
ble for FEA support an unemployed must hold a first professional degree 
or have a minimum number of years of work experience.21 In addition, the 
potential participant has to be either unemployed, directly threatened with 
unemployment, or without any professional degree. If not receiving UB or 
UA directly before entering a programme, individuals must be employed 
for at least two years within the three years prior to the programme. As 
discussed in Section 3.3 our selected sample fulfils the eligibility rules. 
If the unemployed meet these conditions, she could be offered a pro-
gramme by her caseworker. Before going into the details of the determi-
nants underlying the selection decisions of both parties, it is helpful to un-
derstand the rules of their interaction. The unemployed and her case-
worker meet at least every three months to discuss the job search efforts 
of the unemployed, new job offers available, potential benefits of partici-
pating in labour market programmes, as well as potential adaptations of 
their strategy for getting the unemployed back to work.22 Usually, it is the 
caseworker but it may also be the unemployed herself who proposes par-
                                                
21 The exact requirement is either a formal professional degree plus three (since 1994 
zero) years of work experience, or no degree but at least six (since 1994 three) years 
of work experience.  
22 The caseworker can schedule a meeting at any time but at least every three months, 
e.g. to check the availability of the unemployed for job placement, or to discuss new 
job offers or participation in labour market programmes. Attendance is compulsory for 
the unemployed. See § 132 EPA. 
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ticipation in training to improve her chances of finding a job. In any case, 
the unemployed must apply for FEA support before the beginning of the 
programme, and the caseworker decides whether she will receive support. 
There is no legal entitlement to FEA support, and caseworkers have a con-
siderable amount of discretion in making their decision about programme 
participation. However, they have to use this discretion in accordance with 
the objectives of the EPA as well as the specific aims of the programme 
(§ 33 EPA). They also have to consider the situation and development of 
the labour market, and they have to act based on the principle of eco-
nomic efficiency. In addition, caseworkers have to take into account the 
aptitude of the applicant for specific jobs and her chances for completing a 
specific programme successfully (§ 36 EPA). In particular, the case-
worker's decision has to be guided by the consideration of which of the 
available measures have the highest chances for success and are the least 
costly, that is, most efficient for a specific individual (§ 7 A FuU). 
Usually the caseworker decides in consultation with the potential partici-
pant whether or not and if so what kind of training programme would be 
appropriate based on an assessment of the employment prospects of the 
unemployed. Since the willingness to participate in labour market pro-
grammes is a precondition for receipt of UB and UA, unemployed who re-
fuse to apply or, having applied, refuse to participate in a training meas-
ure, risk suspension of their benefits for up to eight weeks.23
In a typical selection process, the caseworker's decision about referral of 
applicants to specific programmes is guided by two objectives: efficiency 
or equity. Caseworkers pursuing efficiency goals assign those individuals 
to the programmes that they expect to benefit most. In contrast, equity 
goals require caseworkers to select the neediest individuals into the pro-
grammes, where neediness is defined for example by a high risk of be-
coming long-term unemployed. The factors relevant for pursuing the latter 
policy probably are best approximated in our data by the (short) employ-
ment and unemployment history after unification24 as well as by the eco-
                                                
23 They may even loose their entitlement altogether if benefits have already been sus-
pended before (§ 119 EPA). 
24 Heckman and Smith (1999, 2004) point to the importance of this information when 
analysing participation in the Job Training Partnership Act in the United States. 
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nomic situation of the individual. The latter in turn is largely determined 
by the last job, educational attainment, nationality and family status since 
these variables govern chances in the labour market. These factors may 
be related to the effect maximising strategy. In addition, we expect that 
participation rates decline with age, because the amortisation period of 
the human capital investment shrinks. Furthermore, as mentioned for ex-
ample again by Heckman and Smith (1999) the state of the local economy 
may also be a factor influencing the decision of sending somebody into a 
programme or not. The caseworker, however, may be supply constrained 
and not able to offer what he considers best. Yet this is not so important 
here, because it is likely that conditional on all other variables, like the 
regional information, this variable is not correlated with the outcomes. 
From the point of view of the unemployed, her decision whether or not to 
participate in a programme is guided by considerations very similar to 
those of the caseworker. There are, however, additional reasons for join-
ing or not joining a programme: If the unemployed sees no chance to find 
a job anyway, with or without a programme, he may prefer not to join a 
programme that reduces his leisure time (an important issue in a rapidly 
contracting East German economy). Again, we capture this fact by using 
his (un)employment history as well as regional variables as a proxy. Fi-
nally, legislation also provides a rather strong incentive to participate in 
training supported by payment of MA: periods of receipt of MA can extend 
existing or renew exhausted UB entitlements. To control for this fact, we 
have constructed variables from the (un)employment histories indicating 
the UB claim at the beginning and at the end of a spell. 
Finally, since unemployment is rapidly rising during 1993 and 1994 and 
participations shows a varying pattern as well, we condition on the month 
of the start of the programmes thus netting out seasonal and timing ef-
fects. 
Our data capture the factors determining participation mentioned so far by 
detailed proxy variables, in fact much more detailed than usually available 
in many administrative datasets used for evaluation purposes (see Table 
A.1 in the appendix for details about all variables used). However, as al-
ready noted in the previous section, in our data there is no information 
about the caseworker's direct assessment of the strengths and weak-
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nesses of the unemployed, for example with respect to his motivation and 
ability. As usual for these variables, we have to rely on their indirect ef-
fects, i.e. on their effect on the employment and the earnings history that 
materialised in the past.  
4.2 The empirical determinants of programme participa-
tion 
Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for selected socio-economic vari-
ables for the different subsamples defined by treatment status. Concen-
trating on the four groups included in the econometric analysis, the results 
can be summarised as follows: (i) Participants in retraining are on average 
32 years old and thus about five years younger on average than other un-
employed are. This is in line with the idea that substantive human capital 
investments are more beneficial the longer the productive period of the 
new human capital is. (ii) Participants in retraining are less educated and 
skilled than the rest. (iii) The mirror image of this observation is that par-
ticipants in short and long training are better educated and in higher job 
positions than the rest. This difference is particularly pronounced for those 
individuals in long training. Usually, in the West it would seem that par-
ticipants in long training have the best a priori chances on the labour mar-
ket. However, here the 'last job' is most likely the one that comes from 
continued employment before and after unification. Thus, the qualifica-
tions coming with these types of occupations may be heavily discounted in 
the new economic order. (iv) For the two variables indicating remaining 
UB claims, Table 4.1 does not show much variation. (v) Concerning male-
female differences, note that the share of women among the unemployed 
is much higher in East Germany than in the West which is reflected in the 
high share of women among nonparticipants and participants in long and 
short training, but not in the share of women observed in retraining, the 
latter showing a 'male' bias. (vi) Finally, note that there are some regional 
differences that, however, do not appear to be related to the local unem-
ployment rate (see Appendices A and B for a list of more disaggregated 
regional variables and the influence on participation). 
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Table 4.1: Selected descriptive statistics according to participation status 
(means or shares in %) 
 Nonparticipation Short training Long training Retraining 
Number of observations 4604 321 538 445 
Personal characteristics 
Women 63 65 65 43 
Age* 37 36 38 32 
Education: No professional degree 12 7 4 14 
                  With professional degree 78 87 77 81 
                  University, polytechnical degree 4 3 15 3 
Position in last job  
Salaried employee 26 30 54 21 
Part-time worker 26 20 17 10 
Master craftsman 1 0 1 0 
Unskilled worker 22 25 13 28 
Skilled worker 26 26 16 40 
Last monthly earnings  
Salary in Euros* 947 1053 1204 1144 
Remaining UB claim (before entry into the programme) 
Remaining UB claim (months)* 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.3 
Legal UB claim at the beginning of the last unemployment spell before the programme 
Legal claim* (months) 5.7 5.2 5.8 5.5 
Programme information 
Planned programme duration* (months) 0 3.4 10.5 20.5 
Regional information 
Berlin, Postdam 11 7 7 9 
Saxony, Thuringia 40 46 47 41 
Mecklenburg-Western-Pomerania, Branden-
burg 10 14 15 18 
Saxony-Anhalt 17 10 14 13 
Regional information missing 22 23 17 19 
Local unemployment rate               ≤ 15%  35 33 37 34 
   15% < UE rate ≤ 20%  58 58 56 56 
             UE rate > 20%   7 9 7 10 
Employed in 
January 1991 N = 3326 90.8 94.5 97.6 92.9 
              1992        5911 60.0 69.2 73.7 75.2 
              1993       6150 50.2 53.9 61.9 59.0 
              1994       6194 21.9 20.9 16.0 16.0 
              1996       6196 34.4 42.4 42.0 20.4 
              1998       6196 32.5 46.1 45.7 48.5 
              2000       6196 37.4 49.5 49.6 49.0 
              2002       6148 36.4 51.4 46.3 51.4 
Subsidised employment in 
January  2002       6148 5.8 7.3 6.5 4.2 
Note:  * Numbers are means rather than shares. ++  Measured in the year of the programme start. Subsidised employment 
includes temporary wage subsidies, job creation schemes and structural adjustment measures. The sample used 
for the table is the one after all selection steps described in Section 3, but before imposing the common support re-
quirement. For a detailed list of variables, see the appendix. 'N =' means the number of individuals for whom this in-
formation is available at that point in time. See Appendix A for the full set of descriptive statistics. 
The lower part of Table 4.1 refers to one of the main outcome variables 
used in this study, namely whether an individual is employed in particular 
months before and after the programme. First, note that when we go back 
in time, the sample size decreases because of the effect of introducing the 
statistical system already discussed above. Second and related to the first 
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point, before the programme (in 1991) employment mainly reflects the 
fact that this type of history is only available from employers that early 
sent employment information to the social security administration, thus 
individuals with this early information are typically employed. Third, in 
2002 subsidised employment is still a considerable part of employment 
(15%; this information is unavailable before 2000 and incomplete for 
2000-2001). 
In Figure 4.1, we show the time path of employment (subsidised and un-
subsidised) and unemployment rates for the different groups of partici-
pants and the nonparticipants relative to the actual or simulated beginning 
of the training. By construction of the sample, all members of these 
groups must be unemployed in the month before participation. Thus, the 
unemployment and employment rates show the usual dip/increase before 
participation (cf. Ashenfelter 1978). Furthermore, note that prior to the 
unemployment spell in which participation happens, all individuals are in 
employment. Thus, there is a sharp increase in unemployment rates start-
ing about one year before participation and a corresponding decline in 
employment rates.  
Figure 4.1: Employment and unemployment rates by participation status 
        Employment          Unemployment 
  
         Months before and after start    Months before and after start 
             
Note:  The employment and unemployment information is given only up to 36 months prior to train-
ing. Due to the process of gathering administrative data after unification, many unemployed 
may be observed for shorter periods. 
 
After the programme, all employment measures show some recovery. The 
immediate speed of the recovery is negatively correlated to programme 
duration, pointing to a lock-in effect of participation (cf. Van Ours 2004). 
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None of the groups reaches its previous levels, but the rate of recovery for 
nonparticipants is particularly low, already foreshadowing the results of 
the econometric part below. Note the interesting difference that appears 
between unemployment and employment. Both measures of labour mar-
ket attachment show the same shape over time. However, for registered 
unemployed (defined as receipt of some form of benefits or participation 
in training) there does not appear to be any difference between the differ-
ent groups of participants in the long run, pointing to a significant group 
of people leaving the labour force (see the detailed statistics at the end of 
Table A.1 in Appendix A). 
In addition to the simple statistics describing the differences of the par-
ticipants in the different groups presented above, Appendix B contains the 
detailed results of a multivariate analysis based on modelling the selection 
into the different groups based on a multinomial probit model estimated 
by simulated maximum likelihood. Beyond providing useful descriptive 
statistics, the output from this selection model plays a key role in our se-
lection correction mechanism explained below. The analyses revealed that 
gender, age, education, and last occupation are important individual char-
acteristics that determine participation. Furthermore, although the ob-
served employment and unemployment history is short, it is significantly 
correlated with participation choice. Regional information, such as the in-
dustrial, employment, population and wealth composition of the region as 
well as migration streams and tax revenues, which entered the probit in a 
highly disaggregated way to capture the specifics of supply and demand in 
the local labour market, are an important component of the selection 
process. 
5 Econometrics 
We base our analysis on the prototypical model of the microeconometric 
evaluation literature with multiple treatments (see Appendix C for the 
formal model): An indiidual chooses between several states, like participa-
tion in a specific training programme or nonparticipation in such a pro-
gramme. The potential participant in a programme gets a hypothetical 
outcome (e.g. employment) in both states. If we can observe all factors 
that jointly influence outcomes and the participation decision, then - con-
ditional on these factors - the participation decision and the outcomes are 
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independent like in an experiment. Thus, for the same values of these fac-
tors (call them X) a comparison of the outcomes for the different group of 
participants with the same value of X identifies the effects (like in an ex-
periment). This is the intuition of the so-called matching estimators used 
here.  
The parameters typically estimated by matching methods are the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATET), which is the expected effect of the 
programme m compared to l for its participants, denoted as ,0
m lθ , and the 
average treatment effect (ATE, ,0
m lγ ). This is the expected effect of m com-
pared to l for the population. It is a clear advantage of matching estima-
tors that they are essentially nonparametric, thus independent of the kind 
of functional dependences between outcomes and X and that they allow 
arbitrary individual effect heterogeneity (see also Heckman, LaLonde and 
Smith 1999) and Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) for the case of mul-
tiple treatments. 
As regards identification, ATE’s and ATET’s are generally not identified if 
we do not observe all factors jointly determining outcomes and treat-
ments. Thus, to make this assumption credible we need a very informa-
tive database. We already noted that our data, which are compiled from 
different administrative records, are so rich that it seems plausible to as-
sume that we observe the important factors that jointly influence labour 
market outcomes and the process selecting people into the four different 
states. Therefore, we assume that treatment participation and treatment 
outcome are independent conditional on a set of (observable) attributes. 
In other words, there are no exogenous variables left out that are both 
correlated with potential outcomes and the participation decision.  
If this assumption holds, then for the ATET for example the intuition is to 
find for every participant in one treatment a participant in a comparison 
state who has the same conditional on X choice probabilities between 
those two states. Having found this matched comparison sample, compar-
ing the sample means between the matched comparisons and treated 
gives the desired results. This simple idea can be exploited and modified 
to obtain ‘better’ estimators. Here, we use the modified version suggested 
and applied by Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch (2004) which is detailed in 
that paper and partly in Appendix C. All checks of its operational charac-
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teristics and issues concerning the estimation are contained in the internet 
appendix. The estimator performed reasonably well. 
6 The effects of training 
6.1 Measurement of the outcomes in the labour market 
According to German legislation, one of the objectives of active labour 
market policy is to increase reemployment chances and to reduce the 
probability of remaining unemployed. Therefore, important outcome vari-
ables are those relating to the employment status, like registered unem-
ployment and different types of employment.25 We use different defini-
tions for measuring employment, sometimes requiring a certain quality of 
the job, approximated for example by the job's duration and earnings 
compared to the previous job. Furthermore, we consider gross earnings as 
well, being a crude measure for individual productivity. We present the 
results below for those variables that seem to us most interesting. For all 
the others, the reader may consult the internet appendix that contains all 
background material. Our employment related outcome variables have 
one severe problem, namely that with our data we cannot distinguish sub-
sidised and non-subsidised employment (e.g. employment programmes, 
wages subsidies) before the year 2000. Beginning 2000, this becomes 
possible, but for 2000 and 2001 there is some underreporting. Since in 
East Germany subsidised jobs were used on a large scale in the early and 
mid 1990s, all results presented below that relate to this period have to 
be interpreted with that caveat in mind. Nevertheless, we do have a clean 
measure of the long-run effects of the programmes. 
Effects are measured monthly based on process time: Month 1 in process 
time is the month after the programme started (with simulated start dates 
for nonparticipants). Focusing on the beginning instead of the end rules 
out that programmes appear to be successful, just because they keep 
their participants busy by making them stay in the programme. We con-
sider a programme to have a very positive effect (in the short run) if eve-
rybody would leave for 'good' employment immediately after starting par-
                                                
25 Here 'registered unemployment' is defined as receipt of some form of benefits accord-
ing to the BPR or participation in training according to the TPD. 
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ticipation. Persons participating in any of the programmes are coded as 
registered unemployed (and not as employed) in the outcome variables. 
6.2 Mean effects of programmes for their participants 
Table 6.1 shows the means of the outcomes in the various groups, the es-
timated counterfactual expectations and pair wise comparisons between 
the programmes and nonparticipation. We concentrate on the long-term 
outcome unsubsidised employment eight years (96 months) after partici-
pation started. Columns (3) and (4) give the exact sample sizes (after im-
posing common support). Columns (5) and (8) show the observed mean 
outcomes for the participants in programme m (5) and in programme l 
(8), respectively. Column (6) shows the estimated mean counterfactual 
outcome of treatment m for population l. Column (7) shows the respective 
estimated mean counterfactual outcome of treatment l for population m. 
The comparison of column (5) to column (6) and of column (8) to column 
(7) reveals the magnitude of the selection bias corrected for by the esti-
mation procedure. It is up to a magnitude of about 9%-points for some 
comparisons.  
Table 6.1: Estimated effects on unsubsidised employment 8 years after  
programme start 
Sample size State m state l 
m l 
(
| )
mE Y
S m=  
(
| )
mE Y
S l=  
(
| )
lE Y
S m=  
(
| )
lE Y
S l=  
,
0
m lθ  ,0θ− l m  ,0γ m l  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Short training nonparticipation 292 3542 47.3 51.8 34.3 34.4 13.0* 17.4* 15.8* 
Long training nonparticipation 502 3542 41.4 35.0 37.6 34.4 3.8 0.6 1.2 
Retraining nonparticipation 429 3542 47.6 46.6 40.3 34.4 7.3 12.2 12.5* 
Short training long training 292 502 47.3 44.6 43.0 41.4 4.3 3.2 12.8 
Short training retraining 292 429 47.3 56.0 52.5 47.6 -5.2 8.4 1.5 
Long training retraining 502 429 41.4 41.5 56.1 47.6 -14.7* -6.1 -11.4 
Note: Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level, numbers in italics relate to the 10% level and * to the 1% level. 
See the internet appendix for the same table using the combination of subsidised and unsubsidised employment. 
The estimates of the mean effects of participating in m compared to l for 
the subpopulation observed in the respective state can be computed di-
rectly from columns (5) to (8) and are reported in columns (9) to (10) to-
gether with an indicator of their asymptotic significance. Column (9) 
shows the mean effect for participants in treatment m (difference between 
column (5) and (7)), while column (10) displays the results for partici-
pants in group l (difference between column (6) and (8)). Column (11) 
shows the effects for the joint population of participants and the nonpar-
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ticipants. Since it also considers populations other than m and l, it can be 
larger or smaller than the mean effects for the population m or l.  
Comparing the effects of the programmes to nonparticipation using un-
subsidised employment 8 years after programme start as outcome vari-
able, we find that short training and retraining have substantial positive 
effects on average, at a magnitude of around 10%-points in employment 
gain. The effects of long training are not significantly different from zero, 
though. The estimators of the pair-wise comparisons of the different pro-
grammes are subject to more sampling error due to the much smaller 
comparison samples, thus requiring a larger magnitude of the effect to 
become significant. Therefore, it is not surprising that - with few excep-
tions like the dominance of retraining compared to long training for the 
participants in long training - the effects are hardly significant. 
The following figures show how the effects evolve over time. Figure 6.1 
displays the estimates of the effects of the different programmes (com-
pared to the other states) for participants in the respective programme 
(ATET) for the outcome variables employment and unemployment. A line 
above zero indicates that the programme has a positive effect relative to 
the programme (or nonparticipation) associated with that particular line. 
In other words, a line above zero is good news for the programme appear-
ing in the header of the respective graph and bad news for the one asso-
ciated with the particular line. Only effects significant at the 5% level are 
displayed. To use a consistent definition of employment over time in these 
figures employment covers subsidised and unsubsidised employment. The 
difference between those two types is very small for about the last twenty 
months, but could be particularly important for the short and medium-run 
results (see Section 2). 
The results for long training and retraining show negative effects in the 
short-run that are the larger the longer the programmes. However, since 
we are not able to distinguish subsidised employment from unsubsidised 
employment in the short run, the lock-in effects that are present in all fig-
ures may be just because nonparticipants and participants in short train-
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ing move to employment programmes afterwards.26 In the longer run and 
with respect to employment, Figure 6.1 confirms the results of Table 6.1 
in that retraining and short training dominate nonparticipation on average. 
Long training seems to have positive effects as well, although they are not 
significant at the end of the observation window. However, the partici-
pants in long training would have benefited more had they participated in 
retraining instead. The effects with respect to unemployment are all zero 
in the long run, a finding that already has been suggested by Figure 4.1. 
The reason is probably related to the fact that (i) training programmes 
increase the period of receipt of unemployment benefits; and (ii) after re-
maining unemployed for such a long time, individuals are discouraged and 
leave the labour force. 
In Figure 6.2, we take account of job quality by using the information on 
monthly earnings. The results suggest that training consistently increases 
monthly earnings by about 100-200 EUR in the longer run for all training 
programmes, although the results are not always significant for retrain-
ees. 
To check whether jobs are (somewhat) stable, we use an outcome vari-
able which requires at least seven months of continuous employment (six 
months is the usual probation period in Germany, within that period ter-
mination of a job is very easy for both sides). We obtain comparable re-
sults. The results are confirmed as well when we use a definition of em-
ployment requiring that the new jobs pay at least 90% of the job held 
prior to training (the results are available in the internet appendix). 
                                                
26 Because of this ambiguity, we refrain from presenting accumulated effects, as we did 
for West Germany in Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch (2004). 
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Figure 6.1: Dynamics of the effects ( ,0m lθ ) after the start of the programme  
(differences in %-points) 
      Employment     Unemployment 
  
 
  
Months after start of the programme                                 Months after start of the programme 
      
Note:  Only effects that are significant at the 5% level (point wise) appear in the figures.  
 
 
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 14/2005   
 
37
Figure 6.2: Dynamics of the effects (
,
0
m lθ ) monthly earnings (in EUR) 
 
Months after start of the programme                                        Months after start of the programme 
 
Months after start of the programme 
 
Note: Only effects that are significant at the 5% level (point wise) appear in the figures. 
 
6.3 Heterogeneity by types of unemployed 
So far, we have considered the average effects for the participants in the 
different programmes. However, since these groups are heterogeneous, 
we might expect that there may be differences in how the programmes 
affect different types of participants. Therefore, we investigate whether 
groups defined by different exogenous socio-economic characteristics ex-
hibit different effects by stratifying the sample along the dimensions un-
employment duration, type of region, type of occupation and gender, and 
match within the strata. Note however, that the scope of this exercise, 
based on a subsample analysis, is limited by the size of our samples of 
trainees. We find significant differences of the effects with respect to the 
regional unemployment rate, the type of occupation before training and 
gender (Appendix D contains detailed results). The effects with respect to 
regional differences suggest that the overall positive effect of short train-
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ing is driven by its high effectiveness in regions with a comparatively low 
unemployment rate, whereas in the other regions it seems to be ineffec-
tive. Furthermore, the subsample results for different types of occupations 
suggest that short training may be the most effective programme for 
skilled workers. However, the sample underlying these estimates may be 
too small to draw robust inferences. 
Clearly, the most substantial differences occur with respect to gender and 
the two longer training programmes (see Table 6.2).27 First, note that in 
the comparison of retraining to nonparticipation, retraining increases the 
employment rate of participating women by about 25%-points, as well as 
it decreases unemployment by about 8% points, and increases monthly 
earnings by about 400 EUR. Retraining is, however, completely ineffective 
for participating men. Compared to short training, men do much worse 
than women do. The reason for these stark differences appear to be the 
different types of retraining obtained by women compared to men. In Sec-
tion 2 we already showed that the majority of women were retrained to-
wards occupations with average or below average unemployment rates. 
However, more than 70% of the men were trained towards construction 
related occupations, which were in high demand in 1993 and 1994, but 
were severely hurt when the construction boom start to bust in 
1995/1996, just when these unemployed completed their retraining and 
began searching for a job. 
                                                
27 Since the effects for men and women based on the common estimation of the MNP 
model show considerable effect heterogeneity, it appears to be possible that more 
flexibility is required when estimating the decision to participate in a programme. 
Therefore, we estimate MNP's for men and women separately (see Table 6.2), but we 
do not find significant differences in the effects compared to the case with a common 
MNP model. 
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Table 6.2: Effects 8 years after the beginning of the programme according to 
gender (ATET; difference in %-points and differences in EUR) 
Treated Obs. Com-parison Obs. 
Unsubsidised 
employment Unemployment Earnings 
 M W  M W M W M W M W 
Short training  98 160 nonpart. 1252 1888 20.7* 11.7 -9.2 2.6 355* 190 
Long training  159 292 nonpart.   -11.2 11.0* 16.7* 1.7 -96 228* 
Retraining  232 161 nonpart.   0.8 25.5* 2.3 -8.3 4 386* 
Short training 98 160 long train. 159 292 13.7 -2.8 -11.1 4.2 142 -79 
Short training    retraining 232 161 -0.8 -17.5 0.1 3.5 -84 -275 
Long training  159 292 retraining   1.5 -19.5* 12.4 8.4 227 -199 
Long training    short train. 98 160 0.7 3.2 7.2 -9 16 136 
Retraining 232 161 short train.   -11.1 13.7 5.6 -23.3* -154 198 
Retraining   long train. 159 292 7.9 3.4 -5.7 -10.9 80 -16 
Note:  Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level, numbers in italics relate to the 10% level and * to the 1% level. 
Cells shaded in grey indicate that the difference of the two estimated effects is significant at the 5% level. Employ-
ment is the combination of subsidised and nonsubsidised employment. Results are based on estimates in the dif-
ferent subsamples (including the MNP estimation) for men and women. M: Men, W: Women. 
The differences between men and women that appeared for retraining are 
of a similar magnitude for long training, but now participating in long 
training really hurts men in reducing their employment probabilities and 
increasing their unemployment probabilities. However, with respect to the 
negative effect for men, month 96, which is given the table, really is an 
exception. For almost all other months, a zero effect for long training 
compared to nonparticipation cannot be rejected and male-female differ-
ence is smaller than for retraining. Short training courses appear to be ef-
fective for men as well as for women. 
6.4 Sensitivity analysis 
We performed several sensitivity tests to check whether choices about is-
sues of implementation are relevant for the robustness of our results. For 
the sake of brevity, we summarise the results and refer the interested re-
ader to the internet appendix for any details.  
First, the common support criterion is tightened by defining the upper and 
lower bounds as the 10th largest and smallest observation instead of the 
minimum or maximum. This leads to a better match in the tails of the 
propensity score distribution. Although a considerable number of observa-
tions is dropped, the effects hardly change in magnitude, though there is 
some change in the significance levels. Nevertheless, the overall conclu-
sions do not change.  
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Second, the additional matching variables other than gender used to de-
fine the distance metric in the matching algorithm are not used. Here, the 
results are qualitatively the same, but in particular for retraining, the ef-
fects are somewhat smaller and fewer of them are significant.  
The third check concerned smoothing the estimated effects by computing 
three-month moving averages of the respective outcome variables (thus 
increasing precision). Not surprisingly, the results are a bit 'smoother', but 
the efficiency gains appear to be very small. 
Finally, the region Berlin could be a special case because it combines East 
Berlin (former capital of the GDR) with West Berlin, which experienced the 
West German economic system even before unification. Therefore, we 
redo all estimations excluding all inhabitants of Berlin (the distinction be-
tween who was living in East and West Berlin before unification is not re-
liably possible with our data). Again, the results are qualitatively the 
same. 
7 Conclusion 
We analyse the effects of public sector sponsored training for the unem-
ployed in the beginning of the transition process in East Germany. Our mi-
croeconometric analysis is based on new, large and fairly informative ad-
ministrative data that allows us to use robust nonparametric estimators, 
like matching in a multiple treatment framework, to control for potential 
selection bias, and we observe interesting labour market outcomes over 8 
years.  
Generally, training increases long-term employment prospects and earn-
ings, but does not change registered unemployment. The positive long-
run effects need some years to materialise because for all programmes 
there are initial negative (lock-in) effects. The magnitude of the lock-in 
effects, and thus the time needed until positive effects appear, is related 
to the programme duration. On average, positive effects occur about one 
to three years after the programmes are completed. 
This general finding is however not at all true for men participating in long 
training and retraining. At least part of the explanation for the negative 
results for men is that caseworkers in East Germany tended to retrain 
many of the male unemployed towards occupations in the construction 
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sector (about 70% of the participants in retraining) that experienced a 
boom during those years. Unfortunately, soon after the courses were 
completed, the boom went into a bust and the blessings of having ob-
tained funding for long vocational training course became a curse for its 
participants. 
A major limitation of our approach and the data available from administra-
tive sources is that prior to the year 2000 it is impossible to distinguish 
between subsidised employment, for example in an employment pro-
gramme, and unsubsidised employment in the first labour market. There-
fore, the first six to seven years of the dynamics of the effects have to be 
interpreted with that caveat in mind. However, since for 2002 this data is 
available, our long-term findings are not subject to this problem. More-
over, the availability of data about the individual costs of the different pro-
grammes would greatly enhance the value of any evaluation study. 
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Appendix A: Data 
Table: A.1: Descriptive statistics 
 Non-
participation 
Short 
training 
Long 
training 
Retraining Practice 
firm 
Other  
Number of observations 4604 321 538 445 162 118 
Proportions in % 
Personal characteristics 
Women 63 65 65 43 58 36 
Older than 50 years 8 7 6 1 9 1 
Younger than 26 years  12 12 9 23 12 19 
Age* 36.82 36.18 37.62 31.64 37.16 34.17 
Marital status:  Single 41 40 32 48 33 44 
  Married 59 60 68 52 67 56 
Children: No child 40 35 32 40 43 41 
 At least one child 60 65 68 60 57 59 
Education 
No professional degree 12 7 4 14 8 5 
With professional degree 78 87 77 81 86 92 
University degree, Polytechnical degree 4 3 15 3 4 4 
Position in last job  
Salaried employee 26 30 54 21 31 31 
Part-time worker 26 20 17 10 12 9 
Master craftsman 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Unskilled worker 22 25 13 28 23 14 
Skilled worker 26 26 16 40 34 45 
Last occupation  
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 6 7 4 9 7 8 
Plumbing, metal construction technology, tech-
nology, natural sciences, machinist, electronics  9 11 14 14 14 19 
Food and nutrition, merchant (goods and ser-
vices), transportation, storage, administration, 
office work, business and social sciences, health 
services, hairdressing, guest assistance, house-
keeping, cleaning, security services, social ser-
vices, education, counselling, media, humanities, 
arts, unskilled worker 
55 59 66 47 51 45 
Construction, woodworking 9 8 4 11 17 14 
Chemical worker, polymer processing, metal 
production and processing, textile, leather, cloth-
ing, paper manufacture and processing, printing, 
mining, stone, ceramics and glass making and/or 
processing 
5 5 2 13 6 8 
Industrial sector  
Construction 8 6 5 8 9 11 
Commerce, banking, insurance, local and re-
gional authorities, social insurance, non-profit 
organisations, private household, transportation, 
telecommunications, other services 
58 64 60 54 59 42 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 2 2 1 2 1 3 
Energy and supply industry, mining, manu-
facturing (without construction) 27 25 30 32 27 37 
 
Table A.1 to be continued 
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Table: A.1: Descriptive statistics (continued-1) 
 Non-
participation 
Short 
training 
Long 
training 
Retraining Practice 
firm 
Other  
Last monthly earnings 
Salary in Euros* 947 1053 1204 1144 1137 1132 
No information 20 12 13 9 9 8 
1278 > salary 53 55 41 53 54 55 
1278 ≤ salary < 2556 25 33 42 39 35 36 
2556 ≥ salary 2 0 3 0 1 1 
Remaining unemployment (UE) benefits claim at the end of the last unemployment spell before entry in the programme 
Remaining UE benefits claim (in months)* 2.24 2.08 2.25 2.34 2.08 3.42 
No information or no claim  56 59 55 53 56 36 
≤ 6 months    31 30 32 33 32 42 
≤ 1 year  43 40 44 47 43 63 
≤ 18  44 41 45 47 43 64 
≤ 2 years  44 41 45 47 44 64 
Legal UE benefits claim at the beginning of the last unemployment spell before the programme 
Legally claim* (months) 5.73 5.15 5.78 5.52 5.52 6.27 
No information  25 27 21 22 20 16 
No claim 8 10 9 7 10 5 
≤ 6 months  15 16 19 20 22 23 
≤ 1 year  63 61 65 70 68 78 
≤ 18 months  66 62 69 70 69 79 
Up to 2 years  67 63 69 71 70 79 
Unemployment benefits or assistance in the month before beginning of the programme 
Unemployment benefits 74 73 79 78 80 84 
Unemployment assistance 26 27 21 22 20 16 
Various historical un/ out-of/employment  information before the "first unemployment period" 
Months of last employment spell* 15.74 14.96 16.58 16.35 15.15 17.16 
Proportion of employment months (in %)*      63.38 72.13 77.10 77.54 75.01 79.29 
Proportion of out-of-labour months (in %)*      11.63 9.37 8.85 9.86 9.60 5.77 
Proportion of UE months (in %)*  13.14 9.98 7.84 7.69 11.31 7.75 
# of programs up to 2 years before the UE pe-
riod*      0.18 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.14 
# of programs  up to 5 years before the UE pe-
riod* 0.22 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.18 
# of programs from entry in the data up to the UE 
period (UEP)* 0.23 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.18 
Mean duration of UE spells up to 2 years before 
the UEP* 2.06 1.94 1.37 1.37 1.74 1.23 
Mean duration of UE spells up to 5 years before 
UEP* 3.08 2.24 1.79 1.73 2.16 1.75 
Mean duration of UE spells from entry in data up 
to UEP* 3.12 2.24 1.79 1.72 2.14 1.75 
Mean duration of employment spells up to 2 
years before UEP* 7.28 9.40 9.93 9.80 10.62 10.35 
Mean duration of employment spells up to 5 
years before UEP* 13.06 13.42 15.21 14.73 13.29 15.51 
Mean duration of employment spells from entry in 
data up to UEP* 14.78 14.11 15.64 15.74 14.10 15.51 
Mean duration of out-of-labour spells up to 2 
years before UEP* 1.88 1.60 1.63 1.70 1.52 0.76 
Mean duration of out-of-labour spells up to 5 
years before UEP* 3.00 2.30 2.10 2.27 2.31 1.64 
Mean duration of out-of-labour spells from entry 
in the data up to the UEP* 3.34 2.33 2.26 2.32 2.31 1.64 
 
Table A.1 to be continued 
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Table: A.1: Descriptive statistics (continued-2) 
 Non-
participation 
Short 
training 
Long 
training 
Retraining Practice 
firm 
Other  
Total months in all prog. up to 2 years before the 
UEP* 2.10 1.46 0.89 0.71 0.69 1.19 
Total months in all prog. up to 5 years before the 
UEP* 2.42 1.66 0.95 0.77 0.75 1.51 
Total months in all prog. before entry in sample* 2.47 1.66 0.95 0.77 0.85 1.51 
Various un/employment information from the "first unemployment period" 
Duration of the "first UE spell"* 7.59 8.04 7.39 6.41 6.65 4.91 
Duration of last UE spell before programme* 6.66 6.44 6.23 5.12 5.72 3.98 
Time since beginning of last UE spell (before the 
prog.) even if other state between UE and prog.* 6.68 8.17 7.46 6.58 6.56 4.89 
Time between the prog. and last job* 14.60 12.79 11.65 10.20 9.77 8.23 
3 months ≥ time between prog. and last job 15 17 15 19 19 31 
6 months ≥ time between prog. and last job 34 35 34 40 43 58 
12 months ≥ time between prog. and last job 57 61 68 71 78 80 
24 months ≥ time between prog. and the job) 78 86 87 93 94 92 
Transition in 6 months before programme:       
UE. → UE 59 65 65 60 63 43 
Empl. → UE 26 28 29 31 31 49 
Out → UE 9 4 5 6 5 5 
Prog. → UE 5 3 1 3 1 3 
# of prog. in year before actual prog.* 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.08 
# of prog.'s in 6 months before actual prog.* 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 
Regional Information (level of regional administrative unit: town, local district) 
Big City 17 17 14 13 10 3 
Net migration per 1000 inhabitants 14.16 13.41 9.75 9.84 6.38 3.76 
Inhabitants below age 15 in % of the 15-65 year 
olds 19.42 20.19 21.00 21.48 21.40 23.39 
Inhabitants above age 65 in % of the 15-65 year 
olds 18.30 19.12 19.69 20.10 20.85 21.82 
Inhabitants of age 15-65 in % of all inhabitants 59.19 61.63 63.23 63.60 63.63 67.98 
Inhabitants above age 75 in % of all inhabitants 4.23 4.68 4.94 5.07 5.23 5.82 
Recipients of social assistance per 1000 inhabi-
tants 15.07 15.94 15.95 16.43 16.68 16.39 
Fraction of non-German nationals among recipi-
ents of social assistancea  10.51 8.10 9.71 9.98 14.75 11.51 
Net migration per 1000 insured employees* 77.25 66.92 37.52 0.48 5.36 -83.82 
Gross value added - fraction agriculture and 
forestry* 0.65 0.78 1.14 1.36 1.54 2.22 
Gross value added - fraction other services* 42.08 44.10 45.44 44.90 45.91 47.07 
Gross value added - fraction manufacturing* 30.55 31.63 32.41 33.39 32.32 37.65 
Gross value added - fraction commerce and 
transportations* 10.00 10.78 11.16 11.49 11.83 11.90 
Gross value added in DM per inhabitant* 21290 22407 22540 22184 22067 21844 
Tax revenue in DM per inhabitant 159 164 161 174 164 160 
Rural areas   20 15 22 24 28 30 
Core cities and highly concentrated districts in 
agglomerations  13 14 14 12 9 5 
Concentrated and rural districts in agglomera-
tions 19 21 20 21 14 23 
Urbanised areas 36 40 37 36 42 42 
Berlin, Postdam 11 7 7 9 4 1 
Saxony, Thuringia 40 46 47 41 46 56 
Mecklenburg-Western-Pomerania, Brandenburg 10 14 15 18 12 10 
Saxony-Anhalt 17 10 14 13 27 19 
 
Table A.1 to be continued 
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Table: A.1: Descriptive statistics (continued-3) 
 Non-
participation 
Short 
training 
Long 
training 
Retraining Practice 
firm 
Other  
UE rate ≤ 15%  35 33 37 34 27 29 
15% < UE rate ≤ 20%  58 58 56 56 58 57 
UE rate > 20%   7 9 7 10 15 14 
Firms size of the last employer  
No information 19 14 14 7 9 12 
1 to 9 employees 15 12 14 14 10 26 
10 to 99 employees 29 28 28 34 37 30 
100 to 499 employees 21 25 23 24 20 18 
500 employees or more 16 21 21 20 24 14 
Date of entry and exit from the sample 
Date of entry in the data*  Dec. 90 Jun. 91 Jun. 91 Apr. 91 Apr. 91 Jun. 91 
Date of entry in the sample* Nov. 93 Aug. 93 Sep. 93 Aug. 93 Jul. 93 Aug. 93 
Date of beginning of prog.* Jul. 94 Jun. 94 Mai 94 Apr. 94 Fev. 94 Fev. 94 
Outcome+ 
Unemployment in Jan. 1991                 3326 6.1 2.7 1.6 3.5 6.6 3.3 
                                     1992                 5911  31.2 23.9 20.1 16.8 19.4 25.9 
                                     1993                 6150 40.0 38.8 30.6 32.2 26.5 32.5 
                                     1994                 6194 71.2 76.6 80.7 80.7 86.4 51.7 
                                     1995                 6196 62.9 68.9 83.6 93.3 63.6 12.7 
                                     1997                 6196 46.2 43.0 37.9 51.2 44.4 21.2 
                                     1999                 6196 39.3 34.0 33.6 34.8 40.1 17.8 
                                     2001                 6196 33.7 33.0 30.0 30.3 35.2 15.3 
                                     2002                 6148 32.2 31.2 31.7 30.0 36.9 19.8 
Employment in     Jan. 1991                  3326 90.8 94.5 97.6 92.9 93.4 95.0 
                                     1992                 5911  60.0 69.2 73.7 75.2 70.3 71.6 
                                     1993                 6150 50.2 53.9 61.9 59.0 63.0 62.4 
                                     1994                 6194 21.9 20.9 16.0 16.0 12.4 47.5 
                                     1995                 6196 26.2 28.4 14.1 4.3 33.3 85.6 
                                     1997                 6196 34.4 48.6 51.5 40.2 46.3 72.0 
                                     1999                 6196 39.1 52.3 51.7 54.6 49.4 72.9 
                                     2001                 6196 37.3 49.5 49.3 52.6 47.5 71.2 
                                     2002                 6148 36.4 51.4 46.3 51.4 43.3 65.3 
Out-of-Labour   in Jan. 1991                 3326 3.3 2.7 0.8 3.5 0.0 1.7 
                                     1992                 5911  8.8 6.9 6.2 7.8 10.3 2.6 
                                     1993                 6150 9.8 7.3 7.5 8.6 10.5 5.1 
                                     1994                 6194 7.1 2.5 3.4 3.4 1.2 1.0 
                                     1995                 6196 10.8 2.8 2.2 2.5 3.1 1.7 
                                     1997                 6196 19.3 8.4 10.6 8.5 9.3 6.8 
                                     1999                 6196 21.7 13.7 14.5 10.6 10.5 9.3 
                                     2001                 6196 29.0 17.5 20.8 17.1 17.3 13.6 
                                     2002                 6148 31.4 17.4 22.1 18.6 19.7 14.9 
Subsidised empl. Jan.  2002                 6148 5.8 7.3 6.5 4.2 7.6 4.1 
Note:  The sample used for the table is the one after all selection steps described in Section 3, but before imposing the 
common support requirement. Entries that do not add up to 100% within a group of dummy variables are due to 
observations with missing information, and rounding. *The results for variables marked with an asterisk are means 
rather than proportions. **Local unemployment rates for each of the 141 local labour office districts. +The different 
outcomes do not add up to 100% because of some missing values. ++ The category 'No information' includes both 
cases with missing earnings information and with the entry '0'. Zero entries are made for so-called inactive em-
ployment which includes women on maternity leave, men in the military or civil service, as well as employees hav-
ing been ill for more than six weeks.  The first column gives the number of observations used to compute the pro-
portions. The sample size decreases due to different entry dates into the sample (first UE spell in 93/94) and exit 
dates from the sample. Career improvement is omitted because it contains only 8 individuals.   
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Appendix B: Detailed estimation results from the multi-
nomial probit model 
Table B.1 shows the estimation results of a multinomial probit model 
(MNP) using simulated maximum likelihood with the GHK simulator.28 Al-
though being fully parametric, the MNP is a flexible version of a discrete 
choice model, because it does not require the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives assumption to hold. With respect to the specification of the 
covariance structure of choice specific error terms, we impose the nor-
malisation that all correlations with nonparticipation are zero. Further-
more, the correlation between short training and retraining is set to zero 
for reasons of numerical stability (this should not be very restrictive since 
those types of programme cannot not be considered as close substitutes). 
Furthermore, to increase the numerical stability of the results we exclude 
some regional variables and some interaction terms from the choice indi-
ces related to long training and retraining (these variables are insignificant 
in a binary probit of this group against nonparticipation). As shown in Ta-
ble B.2, it turns out that covariance terms are however not significant. 
The number of draws per equation and observation is another choice pa-
rameter. We choose 1000 draws, which is very large by usual standards. 
Table B.1: Estimated coefficients of a multinomial probit model for participa-
tion in a programme  
 Short Training Long Training Retraining 
 Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. 
Constant -4.40 2.78 -3.32 1.81 -1.71 1.68 
Women 0.01 0.17 -0.13 0.11 -0.46* 0.11 
Age/10 -0.26 0.85 1.19 0.61 0.92 0.59 
(Age/10)^2 0.01 0.11 -0.17 -2.08 -0.22* 0.08 
Marital status:  Single 0.03 0.15 -0.08 0.10 -0.15 0.11 
Children: No child -0.08 0.16 -0.04 0.10 -0.01 0.11 
Education (reference category: polytechnical degree, University degree) 
No professional degree -0.12 0.36 -1.16* 0.21 -0.23 0.26 
Professional degree 0.39 0.34 -0.58* 0.14 -0.24 0.21 
Position in last job (reference category: master craftsman, skilled and unskilled worker)  
Salaried employee -0.28 0.23 0.53* 0.12 -0.12 0.14 
Part-time worker 0.11 0.22 0.26 0.16 -0.24 0.17 
Last occupation (reference category: Chemical worker, polymer processing, metal production and processing, textile, leather, 
clothing, paper manufacture and processing, printing, mining, stone, ceramics and glass making and/or processing) 
Plumbing, metal construction technology, technology, natural 
sciences, machinist, electronics  
0.10 0.28 0.57* 0.22 -0.30 0.19 
 
Table B.1 to be continued 
                                                
28 See for example Börsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou (1993) and Geweke, Keane and Runkle 
(1994). 
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Table B.1: Estimated coefficients of a multinomial probit model for participa-
tion (continued-1) 
 Short Training Long Training Retraining 
 Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. 
Food and nutrition, merchant (goods and services), transportation, 
storage, health services, hairdressing, guest assistance, house-
keeping, cleaning, security services, social services, education, 
counselling, media, humanities, arts, unskilled worker 
-0.11 0.25 0.17 0.19 -0.48* 0.15 
Construction, woodworking 0.04 0.33 0.18 0.27 -0.39 0.21 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 0.02 0.37 0.31 0.28 -0.27 0.21 
Administration, office work, business and social sciences 0.24 0.31 0.71* 0.22 -0.28 0.22 
Industrial sector (reference category:  Energy and supply industry, mining, manufacturing (without construction)) 
Commerce, banking, insurance, local and regional authorities, 
social insurance, non-profit organisations, private household, 
transportation, telecommunications, other services 
0.19 0.17 -0.12 0.10 0.08 0.11 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing -0.43 0.62 -0.38 0.36 -0.05 0.29 
Construction -0.25 0.30 -0.38 0.20 -0.34 0.19 
Last monthly earnings 
log(last monthly earnings) 0.48 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.35 0.29 
No information 1.07 1.08 0.96 1.12 0.78 0.99 
2500 > salary -0.09 0.16 -0.21 0.11 -0.20 0.11 
Remaining unemployment (UE) benefits claim at the end of the last unemployment spell before entry in the programme  
Remaining UE benefits claim (in months) 0.20 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.05 
No information 2.71* 0.67 2.00* 0.21 1.91* 0.18 
≤ 6 months    0.23 0.34 -0.08 0.22 -0.07 0.22 
≤ 2 years ( and > 0 )  2.06* 0.69 1.85* 0.35 1.41* 0.36 
Legal UE benefits claim at the beginning of the last unemployment spell before the programme 
Legally claim* (in months) -0.08 0.06 -0.04 0.04 -0.06 0.04 
No claim -0.91 0.36 -0.79* 0.21 -0.74* 0.22 
≤ 6 months  -0.23 0.29 0.10 0.17 -0.18 0.17 
≤ 18 months  -0.52 0.52 -0.72 0.30 0.04 0.32 
Various historical un/ out-of/employment  information before the "first unemployment period" 
Months of last employment spella -1.09 1.51 -1.00 1.11 -1.87 1.01 
Months of last employment spella ^2 0.22 0.98 0.01 0.68 0.97 0.62 
Proportion of employment months (in %) before the UE spella     0.04 0.04 0.09* 0.03 0.09* 0.03 
Proportion of UE months (in %) before the UE spella 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.11* 0.04 
Mean duration of employment spells up to 2 years before UEPa -3.39 3.72 -5.46 2.49 -2.28 2.48 
Mean duration of employment spells up to 2 years before UEPa ^2 20.63 16.47 30.15* 11.01 14.89 10.83 
Duration of last UE spell before programmea -0.51 0.85 -0.71 0.64 -1.24 0.71 
Duration of last UE spell before programmea ^2 -0.73 0.42 -0.66 0.33 -0.75 0.39 
Duration of the "first UE spell"a -1.61* 0.38 -1.54* 0.25 -1.76* 0.23 
Time since beginning of last UE spell (before the prog.) even if 
other state between UE and prog. a
5.30* 0.98 3.59* 0.52 4.30* 0.48 
Log(time since beginning of last UE spell (before the prog.) even if 
other state between UE and prog. a) 
-1.31 0.77 0.07 0.52 -0.16 0.52 
12 months ≥ time between prog. and last job 0.61 0.28 0.41* 0.15 0.35 0.16 
Transition in 6 months before the programme: empl. → UE 0.55 0.31 0.30 0.16 -0.12 0.16 
Number of prog. in year before actual programme 0.11 0.35 -0.47 0.26 0.05 0.22 
Unemployed and employment status before prog?reference categories: out-of-labour, missing) 
Unemployed the 6th. month before prog. -0.44 0.37 -0.35 0.21 -0.14 0.22 
Unemployed the 24th. month before prog. -0.30 0.25 -0.37 0.18 -0.63* 0.18 
Unemployed the 36th. month before prog. -0.74 0.33 -0.13 0.19 -0.49 0.22 
Employed the 6th. month before prog. -0.33 0.35 -0.53 0.22 -0.16 0.24 
Employed the 24th. month before prog. -0.08 0.19 -0.13 0.13 -0.09 0.12 
Employed the 36th. month before prog. -0.27 0.17 -0.02 0.10 -0.16 0.11 
 
Table B.1 to be continued 
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Table B.1: Estimated coefficients of a multinomial probit model for participa-
tion (continued-2) 
 Short Training Long Training Retraining 
 Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. 
Regional information 
Big City  0.24 0.32 -0.27 0.18 -0.31 0.20 
Net migration per 1000 inhabitants.a (if local district not missing) 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Inhabitants below age 15 in % of the 15-65 year olds.a,b 11.94 5.36   7.02* 2.60 
Inhabitants above age 65 in % of the 15-65 year olds.a,b 11.84 5.22   6.21 2.49 
Inhabitants of age 15-65 in % of all inhabitants.a,b 25.30 11.17 -0.11 0.16 13.92* 5.40 
Inhabitants above age 75 in % of all inhabitants.a,b 0.77 2.66 0.32 0.53 3.16 1.79 
Recipients of social assistance per 1000 inhabitants.a,b 0.03 0.12 -0.06 0.08 -0.09 0.08 
Fraction of non-German nationals among recipients of social 
assistance.a,b
-0.01 0.16 -0.10 0.11 0.06 0.10 
Gross value added - fraction agriculture and forestry.a,b -23.13 10.13   -13.6* 4.87 
Gross value added - fraction other services.a,b -22.96 10.13   -12.78* 4.89 
Gross value added - fraction manufacturing.a,b -22.95 10.11   -12.74* 4.88 
Gross value added - fraction commerce and transportations.a,b -23.01 10.13   -12.59* 4.88 
Log(Gross value added in DM per inhabitant).a,b 0.42 1.21 0.73 0.73 -0.01 0.83 
Log(Tax revenue in DM per inhabitant).a,b -0.28 0.44 0.16 0.24 -0.27 0.28 
Net migration per 1000 insured employees. a,b 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 
Rural areab -0.43 0.23 -0.11 0.12   
(reference category: Saxony-Anhalt) 
No regional information 0.15 0.70 -0.42 0.49 0.44 0.48 
Berlin, Potsdam -0.52 0.76 -0.48 0.51 0.79 0.50 
Saxony, Thuringia 0.23 0.71 -0.24 0.49 0.47 0.48 
Mecklenburg-Western-Pomerania, Brandenburg 0.66 0.73 0.26 0.51 1.13 0.51 
(reference category:  UE rate > 20% ) 
UE rate ≤ 15%  -0.51 0.28 -0.07 0.18 -0.37 0.19 
  15% < UE rate ≤ 20% (E) -0.51 0.25 -0.22 0.18 -0.51* 0.17 
Firms size of the last employer (reference category: 100 employees or more) 
No information 0.18 0.31 0.24 0.18 -0.22 0.22 
1 to 9 employees -0.24 0.19 -0.03 0.13 -0.16 0.13 
10 to 99 employees -0.26 0.15 -0.09 0.10 -0.16 0.10 
Date of entry in the samplea -0.49* 0.17 -0.52* 0.11 -0.61* 0.10 
Age < 26 * time since beginning of last UE spell (before the prog. 
even if other state between UE and prog.) a
-0.21 0.32 0.27 0.23 -0.04 0.21 
Age ≥ 50 * months of last employment spellsa -0.75 1.74 -1.94 1.23   
Empl. → UE in 6 months before prog * claima -0.10 0.06     
Polytechnical degree *time since beginning of last UE spell (before 
the prog. even if other state between UE and prog.) a
-0.61 0.65 -0.36 0.32 -0.43 0.52 
Note:  Simulated maximum likelihood estimates using the GHK simulator (1000 draws in simulator for each observation and 
choice equation). Coefficients of the category NONPARTICIPATION are normalised to zero. Inference is based on 
the outer product of the gradient estimate of the covariance matrix of the coefficients ignoring simulation error. N = 
5908. Value of the log-likelihood function: -0.570502. Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level, numbers in 
italics relate to the 10 % level and * to the 1 % level. a The variable is scaled. b If local district not missing. 
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Table B.2: Estimated covariance and correlation matrices of the error terms in 
the multinomial probit  
 Non-participation Short Training Long Training Retraining  
 Coef t-val Coef t-val Coef t-val Coef t-val 
NONP 1 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 
ST 0  1 - 0.25 0.53 0 - 
LT 0  0.24  1.06 4.59 -1.00 -1.22 
RT 0  0  -0.69  2.01 1.21 
Note:  Diagonal and upper triangular matrix shows covariance terms. Correlations are shown in the 
part below the main diagonal. In the estimation Cholesky factors are used for parameterisation 
to ensure that the estimated covariance matrix of the error terms is positive definite. 
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Appendix C: Technical details of the matching estimator 
used 
Here, we consider outcomes of five different states denoted by 
290 1 2 3 4{ , , , , }Y Y Y Y Y . The different states are called treatments in the econo-
metric evaluation literature. For any individual, only one component of 
 is observable. Participation in a particular treatment m is 
indicated by the realisation of the random variable S, . This 
notation allows us under the usual assumptions (see Rubin, 1974) to de-
fine average treatment effects for pair wise comparisons of the effects of 
different states (Lechner, 2001, 2002): 
0 1 2 3 4{ , , , , }Y Y Y Y Y
{0,1,2,3,4}S∈
γ 0m l m l m lE Y Y EY EY, ( )= − = − ; (C.1) 
θ 0m l m l m lE Y Y S m E Y S m E Y S m, ( | ) ( | ) ( |= − = = = )− = ;      ; , {0,1, 2,3}m l m l≠ ∈ . (C.2) 
γ 0m l,  denotes the expected effect of treatment m relative to treatment l for 
a participant drawn randomly from the population (average treatment ef-
fect, ATE) (γ 0m l,  = −γ 0l m, ).30 θ 0m l,  is the expected effect for an individual ran-
domly drawn from the population of participants in treatment m only 
(ATET). ATET’s are not necessarily symmetric. Note that we are only in-
terested in states 0 to 3. 
ATE’s and ATET’s are generally not identified so that additional assump-
tions are needed. As stated in the main body of the text we assume that 
treatment participation and treatment outcome is independent conditional 
on a set of (observable) attributes (conditional independence assumption, 
CIA). CIA defined to be valid in a subspace χ  of the attribute space is 
formalised in expression (C.3): 
Y Y Y S X x xM0 1, ,..., | ,C = ∀ ∈χ . (C.3) 
CIA requires that all individuals that are part of the evaluation could par-
ticipate in all states (i.e. , 0 ( |P S m X x< = = ) 0,...,3m∀ = , x χ∀ ∈ ).  
Lechner (2001) showed that the famous result of Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) that CIA conditional on X implies CIA conditional on the choice 
                                                
29 The last state contains a residual group of programmes and is omitted in the estima-
tion part. 
30 If a variable Z cannot be changed by the effect of the treatment then all what follows 
is also valid in strata of the data defined by different values of Z. 
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probabilities conditional on X (the so-called propensity score property) 
also applies to the case of multiple treatments. This property is the basis 
for the so-called matching estimators, a particular version of which is pro-
posed by Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch (2004), which is detailed in Table 
C.1. The interested reader is referred to that paper for the motivation of 
the different choices implicit in the various estimation steps. 
Table C.1: A matching protocol for the estimation of  
,
0
m lθ  and ,0m lγ  
Step 1 Specify and estimate a multinomial probit model to obtain the marginal choice probabilities (see Appendix B): 
; 0 1 2 3ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )]N N N NP x P x P x P x ˆ ˆ( ) : ( | )lN NP x P S l X x= = =
Step 2 Restrict sample to common support: Delete all observations with probabilities larger than the smallest maximum 
and smaller than the largest minimum of all subsamples defined by S. 
Step 3 Estimate the respective (counterfactual) expectations of the outcome variables. 
For a given value of m and l the following steps are performed:  
a-1) Choose one observation in the subsample defined by participation in m and delete it from that pool. 
b-1) Find an observation in the subsample of participants in l that is as close as possible to the one chosen in 
step a-1) in terms of ˆ ˆ( ), ( ),⎡⎣ %m lN N ⎤⎦P x P x x . 'Closeness' is based on the Mahalanobis distance. Do not remove that 
observation, so that it can be used again.  
c-1) Repeat a-1) and b-1) until no participant in m is left. 
d-1) Compute the maximum distance (d) obtained for any comparison between treated and matched comparison 
observations. 
a-2) Repeat a-1). 
b-2) Repeat b-1). If possible, find other observations in the subsample of participants in l that are at least as close 
as R  d to the one chosen in step a-2) (to gain efficiency). Do not remove these observations, so that they can 
be used again. Compute weights for all chosen comparisons observations that are proportional to their distance. 
Normalise the weights such that they add to one. 
*
c-2) Repeat a-2) and b-2) until no participant in m is left. 
d-2) For any potential comparison observation, add the weights obtained in a-2) and b-2). 
e) Using the weights  obtained in d-2), run a weighted linear regression of the outcome variable on the 
variables used to define the distance (and an intercept).  
( )iw x
f-1) Predict the potential outcome  of every observation in l and m using the coefficients of this regres-
sion: .  
( )l iy x
ˆ ( )l iy x
f-2) Estimate the bias of the matching estimator for   as: ( | )lE Y S m=
1
ˆ ˆ1( ) ( ) 1( ) ( )l lN i i
m m
i
S m y x S l w y x
N N=
= =−∑ i . 
g) Using the weights obtained by weighted matching in d-2), compute a weighted mean of the outcome variables 
in l. Subtract the bias from this estimate. 
h) Compute the treatment effect by subtracting the weighted mean of the outcomes in the comparison group (l) 
from the weighted mean in the treatment group (m).
Step 4 Repeat Step 3 for all combinations of m and l.
Note: Lechner (2001) suggests an estimator of the asymptotic standard errors for ,ˆm lNγ and ,ˆm lNθ  conditional on the 
weights that we use here. x%  includes the date of the beginning of the programme, sex, three dummies indicating if 
the individual is employed (and observed) 12, 24 and 36 months before the programme. x%  is included to ensure a 
high match quality with respect to these critical variables. R is fixed to 90% in this application. Note that once we 
estimate all ( | )lE Y S m=  for all m, they can be directly used to obtain ( )lE Y . 
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Appendix D: Subgroup analysis 
Table D.1 displays the estimation results for unsubsidised employment in different subgroups of unemployed. We 
use the MNP estimates from the joint model, but the remaining steps of the estimation are performed in the sub-
samples. Thus, the observations do not add up to the number of the observations in the full sample, because the 
common support criterion must delete more observations if used in subsamples separately (a table with detailed 
numbers is available in the internet appendix). The number of observations given in the lower part of the table in-
dicates that in many cases the subsample estimates will be too imprecise to uncover significant differences. 
Table D.1: Effect heterogeneity (unsubsidised employment) eight years after the beginning of the programme (difference 
in %-points) (
,
0
m lθ ) 
 Regional  
UE rate 
Big town Gender Long-term UE Type of occupationa
m - l ≤ 15%  > 15% <100,000 inhab. ≥100,000 inhab. Men Women <12 months ≥12 months Unskilled Skilledb  Salaried 
Short training - nonparticipation  29.7* 3.2 6.1 17.6 15.0 13.6* 21.9* 9.1 7.1 20.1* 8.6 
Short training - long training  17.4 2.3 5.0 12.7 15.6 2.7 15.4 0.9 -14.9 26.7* -3.3 
Short training - retraining  9.6 -10.9 -3.2 5.6 2.7 -12.4 11.1 1.3 -20.6 7.7 -28.0 
Long training - nonparticipation 6.3 1.9 5.3 -6.7 -12.9* 10.2 5.7 1.5 3.4 -4.3 2.6 
Long training - short training  -23.5* 8.5 1.7 -14.4 -18.0 5.4 1.9 -8.9 5.4 -25.2* -4.5 
Long training - retraining  -16.8 -15.3 -12.8 -24.3 -1.1 -19.8* -20.5* -7.9 -13.6 -3.1 -20.6 
Retraining  - nonparticipation  6.8 3.7 5.6 1.8 -4.5 17.3* 14.6* 10.2 -1.6 6.1 17.4 
Retraining  - short training  -24.5* 0.8 -5.7 -25.2 -15.9 -1.4 -7.9 -12.4 0.5 -24.8* 1.8 
Retraining  - long training  0.8 10.6 5.8 15.4 8.7 5.3 12.1 -0.9 7.9 23.8 1.2 
Sample size 
Nonparticipation  1156 2232 2696 639 1367 2013 1856 1502 680 810 946 
Short training  91 187 211 61 101 164 149 130 55 68 80 
Long training 174 309 347 122 170 305 291 186 58 74 263 
Retraining 136 279 351 63 242 174 261 156 101 166 88 
Note:  Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level, numbers in italics relate to the 10% level and * to the 1% level. Comparisons based on less than 50 observations are 
not reported in the table. Cells shaded in grey indicate that the difference of the two estimated effects is significant at the 5% level. a For the comparison short training - re-
training, only the pairwise differences unskilled-skilled and skilled-salaried are significant. b Incl. master craftsman. 
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